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Determinative Statute: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (2004) Arbitration Agreements. 
(1) After May 2,1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient 
and a health care provider to be validly executed, or, if the requirements of this 
Subsection (1) have not been previously met on at least one occasion, renewed: 
(a) the patient shall be given, in writing, the following information on: 
(5) The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a 
binding arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 
1999. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In a great deal of pain and discomfort, plaintiff/appellee Gloria Soriano went to see 
Dr. Elizabeth Graul on April 27, 2004. [R. 71]. Mrs. Soriano was handed a clipboard with 
various forms to fill out while waiting for the doctor. [R. 72], One of these forms was Dr. 
Graul's Arbitration Agreement which waived Mrs. Soriano's right to a jury trial without 
informing her she could still receive treatment without signing. See Arbitration Agreement 
attached as Appendix A. This type of "sign or die" agreement was invalidated by statutory 
amendments which became effective one week after Mrs. Soriano's appointment. 
Dr. Graul eventually performed surgery on Mrs. Soriano in May, 2004 which is the 
basis of this lawsuit filed on September 11, 2006. [R. 1-5]. Instead of answering the 
complaint, Dr. Graul moved the court to enforce her Arbitration Agreement. [R. 12-14]. 
There is no dispute Dr. Graul's Arbitration Agreement complied with the statutory 
requirements of the 2003 version of Utah's Malpractice Arbitration statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-17 (2003)(referred to herein as the "Arbitration Act"). [R. 47]. Likewise, there is 
no dispute the Agreement did not comply with the statutory amendments in the 2004 version 
of the Arbitration Act (referred to herein as the "2004 Amendments"). [R. 75]. Honorable 
Judge Kate Toomey ruled the 2004 Amendments were intended to apply retroactively. Id. 
Dr. Graul's Arbitration Agreement was thus invalid because it did not satisfy the 
requirements of the 2004 Amendments. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, Dr. Graul raises two issues, one explicit and one implied. Dr. GrauPs 
stated issue is whether the district court correctly found the 2004 Amendments were 
retroactive as to invalidate the Arbitration Agreement. The statute clearly stated it applied 
to agreements signed after May 2, 1999 and, therefore, applied to Dr. Graul's Agreement 
signed in April, 2004. Dr. Graul also argues retroactive application of the 2004 Amendments 
violates the Contracts Clause of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions, but Dr. Graul did not 
preserve this issue for appeal. 
Dr. Graul's last argument raises a second issue: whether the Agreement was renewed 
in violation of the 2004 Amendments. Dr. Graul's strained construction of the Act to 
circumvent the trial court's ruling on the retroactivity issue collapses in her final argument 
which demonstrates even if the Agreement was not invalid when executed, it was never 
properly renewed and, thus, equally ineffective to bar a jury trial of Mrs. Soriano's claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LEGISLATURE EXPRESSLY DECLARED THE 2004 
AMENDMENTS MUST BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 
Responding to public outcry over the ill-advised 2003 version of § 78-14-17, the 
legislature amended the Arbitration Act to add various patient protections including the right 
to receive treatment without signing an arbitration agreement.1 Despite the amendments' 
1
 See Bryson B. Morgan, Mandatory Medical Arbitration: The Wrong Answer to the 
Rising Cost of Health Care in Utah, 6 Hinckley Journal of Politics 43 (2005), attached as 
Appendix B. 
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effective date of May 3,2004, the legislature's enacting language began, "After May 2,1999. 
for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care provider to be validly 
executed . . . " (Emphasis added). 
The trial court's reasoning for finding the Amendments retroactive is straightforward. 
Had the legislature not wanted the 2004 Amendments applied retroactively, they would have 
said so by drafting the enacting language to state, "After May 3, 2004 . . . " [R. 74-75]. 
Dr. Graul gives no explanation for the legislature's use of the May 3,1999 date, though the 
simplest explanation is they intended the 2004 Amendments to apply retroactively. To 
paraphrase Occam's Razor, "All things being equal, the simplest solution tends to be the 
right one." 
Statutory construction confirms the legislature's retroactive intent. "Unambiguous 
language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." Salt Lake 
Child and Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick 890 P.2d 1017,1020 (Utah 1995). Thus, 
the Court assumes each term in the statute was used advisedly and does not ignore its plain 
meaning. Id. "[The Court] must be guided by the law as it i s . . . When language is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for 
construction." Id. (citations omitted). The enacting language of the 2004 Amendments is 
clear and unambiguous. By writing the statute to expressly apply to agreements after May 
3, 1999, the legislature clearly expressed retroactive intent and the trial court properly 
rejected Dr. Graul's Arbitration Agreement. 
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Dr. Graul errs in demanding the legislature actually use the word "retroactive" instead 
of providing an earlier effective date as done here. Dr. Graul offers no authority so holding. 
Rather, "[t]he presumption in favor of the prospective applicability of a statute may be 
rebutted when the legislature clearly and unequivocally expresses its intent that the 
legislation will apply retrospectively. The words 'heretofore' and 'has been/ or other 
expressions denoting past time, expressly give the statute a retrospective operation." C.J.S. 
STATUTES § 408 (1999)(emphasis added). For example, inNervo v. Mealey, 25 N.Y.S.2d 
632, 634 (N.Y. Sup. 1940), the statute read, "[i]n case a suspension or revocation has been 
made and the commissioner is satisfied that there was such a failure..." (Emphasis added). 
The Court did not require the statute to contain the term "retroactive," but rather found clear 
legislative intent from the words "has been" denoting past time. Our legislature's use of the 
date May 3, 1999 serves the same purpose and has the same effect. 
Here, the legislature clearly expressed its intent the 2004 Amendments were to 
operate retrospectively by expressly applying them to arbitration agreements signed after 
May 2, 1999. The legislature repeated its intent in Subsection (5) of the Arbitration Act 
stating, "The requirements of Subsection (1) do not apply to a claim governed by a binding 
arbitration agreement that was executed or renewed before May 3, 1999." See Utah Code 
Ann. §78-14-17(5)(2004). "The best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain meaning 
of the statute." Cache Co. v. Property TaxDiv. of Utah State Tax Com% 922 P.2d 758,767 
(Utah 1996). Had the legislature intended to apply the amendments only prospectively, as 
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Dr. Graul avers, they would have simply drafted the enacting line of the statute to read, 
"After May 3, 2004 . . ." The fact the legislature did not do so is a sufficiently express 
declaration of retroactive intent. The trial court, thus, properly found Dr. Graul's Agreement 
invalid because it did not comply with the 2004 Amendments. 
II. DR. GRAUL'S MERE MENTION OF A POSSIBLE CONTRACT 
CLAUSE VIOLATION DID NOT PRESERVE SUCH A CLAIM FOR 
APPEAL 
Dr. Graul failed to preserve her contract clause argument for appeal. Dr. Graul did 
not include this argument in her initial brief in support of her Motion to Compel Arbitration. 
[R. 12-17]. Obviously, then, Mrs. Soriano did not address it in her opposition brief. [R. 21-
32]. The argument, such as it is, was thrown in as an afterthought to Dr. Graul's reply 
memorandum. The argument, in its entirety, consisted of the following: "Retroactive 
application of the 2004 amendment would obviate the one-year term specified by statute and 
in the Arbitration Agreement, would impair the contractual relationship between parties, and 
would fail to pass muster under the Contracts Clause of the U.S. and Utah Constitutions, 
which prohibits laws 'impairing the obligations of contracts.' U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1; 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 18." [R. 48-49]. Yet, having lost her other arguments, Dr. Graul now 
devotes a quarter of her brief to the argument. This is improper. 
Mere citations cannot be thrown into briefs to act as appellate place holders in case 
other arguments actually addressed to the trial court fail; especially in the case of 
constitutional interpretation. In State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,1 16; 164 P.3d 397, the 
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Utah Supreme Court stated, "[i]n order to further develop state constitutional law. . . claims 
must be properly presented to this court." That means, "[t]he issue must be 'raised to a level 
of consciousness' that allows the trial court an adequate opportunity to address it. It follows, 
then, that perfunctorily mentioning an issue, without more, does not preserve it for appeal." 
Id., accord Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ^  14; 122 P.3d 506 ("we are resolute in our 
refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not been properly preserved, framed and 
briefed..."). 
Here, Dr. Graul cited a constitutional provision, but gave no interpretation of the 
provision or how the provision applied to the facts of this case. [R. 49]. As stated in State 
v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^  33; 122 P.3d 543, "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial 
court may not be raised on appeal. A party cannot circumvent that rule by merely mentioning 
an issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority; such a 'mere 
mention' does not preserve that issue for appeal." (Internal citations omitted). 
In this case, Dr. Graul tossed in a constitutional violation argument at the end of a run-
on sentence in her reply brief. More is required to preserve issues for appeal for, otherwise, 
trial court briefs will include bullet point arguments which serve as back-ups in the case of 
an unfavorable ruling. Allowing the mere mention of an issue to serve as preservation mocks 
the purpose of the rule that is to allow the parties to first argue the issue below and the trial 
court the first opportunity to rule on the issue. 
Here, Mrs. Soriano never had an opportunity to address the argument. The issue was 
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not raised at the hearing before Judge Toomey. Judge Toomey did not rule on the issue in 
her Memorandum Decision. [R.71-76]. In Brody v. Mills, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996), 
defendant argued before this Court plaintiffs should be estopped from refusing to sell her a 
condominium. Defendant had indeed mentioned estoppel in her answer and further 
mentioned it in a hearing before the trial court. Despite these brief mentions, this Court ruled 
"these nominal references did not sufficiently raise the issue to a ievel of consciousness' 
before the trial court." Id. at 364; quoting James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah App. 
1987). Likewise, Dr. Graul failed to bring this issue to the trial court's attention, failed to 
present legal authority or factual support for her argument, and failed to have it addressed 
and decided. Therefore, she cannot raise the issue of a contracts clause violation for the first 
time on appeal. 
III. DR. GRAUL'S ARBITRATION AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE 
RENEWED IN VIOLATION OF THE 2004 AMENDMENTS 
Dr. GrauPs last argument claims the trial court ignored the second portion of the 
enacting language of the 2004 Amendments. The 2004 version of the Arbitration Act begins: 
"After May 2,1999, for a binding arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care 
provider to be validly executed, or, if the requirements of this Subsection (1) have not been 
previously met on at least one occasion, renewed..." Dr. Graul interprets this provision as 
follows: "In other words, all arbitration agreements entered into after May 2, 1999, must 
meet the [2004 amendments] of Subsection (1), unless the physician-patient arbitration 
agreement previously met the requirements of Subsection (1) under a previous version of the 
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statute." Appellate Brief at 19 (emphasis added). 
Dr. Graul' s argument that the Arbitration Act's phrase "this Subsection (1)" somehow 
refers to any "previous version" of the Act is unpersuasive. Statutes "should be interpreted 
and applied according to the plain import of their language as it would be understood by 
persons of ordinary intelligence and experience." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 
n. 14 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). It is a stretch indeed to interpret "this" to mem previous 
versions of Subsection (1) that appear nowhere in the Act. Merriam-Webster defines "this" 
as "what is stated in the following phrase, clause, or discourse." Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary (2007).2 In this instance, the 2004 Amendments logically follow the word "this." 
For a valid renewal to occur, the Agreement must thus comply with "this" Subsection (1) -
i.e. the 2004 Amendments. 
Accordingly, even were we to accept Dr. Graul's argument the 2004 Amendments 
were not retroactive, her Agreement is still unenforceable because it could not be renewed 
without complying with the 2004 Amendments. Article 6 of Dr. Graul's Arbitration 
Agreement defined the Term of the Agreement as one year from signing. After that "[i]t 
shall be automatically renewed from year to year thereafter..." See Appendix A. Here, Dr. 
Graul moved the trial court for enforcement of her Agreement more than two (2) years after 
it was signed - meaning it had to be renewed twice under Article 6 (once in 2005 and again 
in 2006). Yet, according to the 2004 Amendments, after May 2, 1999, for a binding 
2
 Attached as Appendix C. 
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arbitration agreement between a patient and health care provider to be renewed it had to meet 
the requirements of this Subsection (1). It is undisputed Dr. GrauPs Agreement did not meet 
the requirements of the 2004 Amendments and, therefore, could not be validly renewed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, appellee Gloria Soriano asks this Court affirm the trial 
court's ruling, rejecting Dr. Graul's motion to enforce her in valid Arbitration Agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this 2<S*day of October, 2007 
SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C. 
FreaK. Silvester 
Spencer Siebers 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee Gloria Soriano 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this^jp'oay of October, 2007,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, via first class United States mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF to the following: 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
STEPHEN T. HESTER 
WILLIAMS HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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' V * . ' : ^ g r e e m e n > to Arbitrates We hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration alt aispure* u»u ui«„.«,
 w 
J for injuries and losses arising from the medical core rendered or which should have been rendered after the date of this Agreement^ claims 
monetary damages against the physician, and the physician's partners, associates, association, corporation or partnership, and the employees, 
*nte and estates of any of them {hereinafter collectively referred to as "Physician"), must be arbitrated including, without limitation, claims for 
•sonal injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional distress or punitive damages. We agree that the Physician may pursue a legal oction 
collect any fee from the patient and doing so shall not waive the Physician's right to compel arbitration of any malpractice claim. However, 
owing the assertion of any malpractice claim against the Physician, any fee dispute, whether or not the subject of any existing legal action, shall 
o be resolved by arbitration. 
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of medical care rendered or 
lich should have been rendered by Physician after the dote of this Agreement, including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children, 
*ether born or unborn at the time of the occurrence giving rise tp any claim [hereinafter collectively referred to as "Patient"), 
Article 2 : W a i v e r of Right to Trial: We expressly waive all rights to pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other remedies 
a court of low, including the right to o jury or court trial, except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any arbitration aword and to 
cflftate the arbitration process as permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
Article 3: Procedures ond Appointment of Arbitrators: Patient shall serve Physician by certified mail with a written demand 
r arbitration which shall specify the nature of the claim, the date of the claimed occurrence, the complained of conduct by the Physician, and a 
ascription of the Patient's injuries and damages. Within 60 days after the demand, the parties shall agree upon a neutral arbitrator to be selected 
om a list of individuals approved as arbitrators by the State or Federal courts of Utah. If the parties cannot agree upon a neutral arbitrator, the 
Durt shall select an individual from that list. The neutral arbitrator shall: preside over the arbitration hearing and pre-arbitration conferences; 
stablish scheduling orders; supervise the conduct of discovery to prevent abuse and insure efficiency and cost-effectiveness; rule on all motions, 
icluding motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence; administer oaths; issue subpoenas; 
ind exercise other powers granted to arbitrators in the Utah Arbitration Act. Within six months of the demand for arbitration or as otherwise ordered 
>y the neutral arbitrator, Patient shall select one arbitrator and Physician shall select one arbitrator. Patient and Physician shall pay the fees and 
expenses of his or her own arbitrator. Each party shall share equally the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator. The parties agree that the 
arbitrators have the immunity of a judicial officer from civil liability when acting in the capacity of an arbitrator under this Agreement. 
All claims based on the same occurrence, incident, or care shall be arbitrated in one proceeding; however, Patient or Physician shall have 
he absolute right to arbitrate separately issues of liability and damage upon written request to the neutral arbitrator. Arbitration hearings will be 
held in the County of the Physician's principal place of business or elsewhere as the parties may agree. 
The parties consent to the participation in this arbitration of any person or entity that would otherwise be a proper additional party in a court 
action and which agrees to be bound by the arbitration decision. Any existing court action against such additional person or entity shall be stayed 
upon agreement to participate in the arbitration. 
The parties agree that the arbitration proceedings are private, not public, and the privacy of the parties and of the arbitration proceedings 
shall be preserved. 
Article 4 : Appl icable Low: With respect to any matter not herein expressly provided for, the arbitration shall be governed by the 
Utah Arbitration Act. All provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, with the exception of the notice of intent and pre-litigotion hearing 
requirements which the parties hereby waive, sholl opply to the arbitration. The comparative fault provisions of Utah law opply to the arbitration 
and the arbitrators shall apportion fault to all persons or entities who contributed to the claimed injury whether or not they are parties to the 
arbitration, 
Article 5 : Revocotiofi! This Agreement may be revoked by written notice mailed to the Physician, by certified mail, within 30 days after 
signature, and if not revoked shall govern all medical services received by the Patient after the date of this Agreement. 
Article 6 : Term: The term of this Agreement is one year from the date it is signed. It shall be automatically renewed from year to year 
thereafter unless either party to this Agreement notifies the other of his or her election not to renew in writing delivered by certified mail prior to the 
renewal date. 
Article 7 : Reod ond Understood? I (Patient or Patient's representative) have read and I understand the above Agreement which 
has been verbally explained to me to my satisfaction. I understand that I have the right to have my questions about arbitration answered and I dc 
not have any unanswered questions. I execute this agreement of my own free will and not under any duress. 
Article 8 : Received C o p y : 1 hove received a copy of this document. 
Article 9 : Severabi l i ty : If any provision of this Agreement is held invalid or unenforceable, the remaining provisions shall remain 
full force and shall not be affected by the invalidity of any other provision. 
Name of Physician, Gr&ujyor Clinic Name of Pofienf (Print) 
Signature of Physi6ar^ or (Date) Signoture/^fPatient orPatient's (Date) 
Authorized Representative Representative 
By: 
(3/03) 
0 i astfd 
8088392106 93 ."90 E003/ET/S0 
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Mandatory Medical Arbitration: 
The Wrong Answer to the Rising Cost of 
Health Care in Utah 
Bryson B. Morgan 
Few pieces of legislation draw attention from the public, and in the increasingly hurried Utah legislative 
process legislators themselves have little time to analyze each bill. In 2003, the Utah State Legislature passed 
Senate Bill 138, which allowed physicians to deny care to patients that refused to sign a mandatory and bind-
ing arbitration agreement. In passing the legislation, legislators relied heavily on claims that increasing med-
ical malpractice insurance premiums were due to skyrocketing medical malpractice lawsuits, and inordinate 
awards from "runaway" juries. In doing so, the true scope and cause of the increasing insurance premiums 
were overlooked. Just months later Intermountain Health Care adopted mandatory arbitration for more than 
170,000 of its patients. The public response to IHC s policy was swift and severe, resulting in the repeal of 
mandatory arbitration only one year later during the 2004 Legislative Session. While the Legislature shoxM 
be commended for their quick repeal of mandatory arbitration, given the rushed environment of the Utah 
legislative process the public can expect such legislative errors to occur in the future 
INTRODUCTION 
Each January, the Utah State Legislature convenes for 45 consecutive days to address the problems facing the res-idents of Utah. Legislators are overloaded with infor-
mation as they sort through the hundreds of proposed pieces 
of legislation. What the exact impact that such legislation 
will have on citizens is given a superficial treatment at best, as 
the legislature continues its stampede to the end of the ses-
sion. Within this atmosphere of law makers struggling to 
understand the complex issues, die potential for error in law-
making is increased. Legislators are forced to rely more and 
more heavily on information from lobbyists and colleagues, 
and when the time to vote on a bill arrives, it has become 
common for a legislator to look to eitiher a member of leader-
ship or the gallery for an indication of how to vote. 
Most legislation enacted by the legislature is thought to 
have little impact on the lives of citizens. The large majority 
of the public does not pay close attention to the laws that are 
passed, and displays little public reaction to them. Mandatory 
medical arbitration, permitted by S.B. 138: Medical 
Malpractice Amendments, however, proved to be the exact 
opposite as public reaction was immediately strong and over-
whelmingly negative. Only after the public recognized and 
reacted to the impact of S.B. 138 did the legislature attempt 
to revise the legislation. The purpose of this essay is to explore 
the law making process through the passage and later repeal 
of S.B. 138. This essay will focus on the inadequate attention 
given to the issue during the 2003 legislative session, and how 
health care providers such as IHC implemented an unpopular 
and controversial mandatory arbitration policy. 
AGENDA SETTING: MANDATORY MEDICAL 
ARBITRATION 
The turmoil started with, and was based almost solely on, 
what Mark Fotheringham, spokesman for the Utah Medical 
Association (UMA), called "some indication that with wide-
spread adoption of arbitration there will be a positive effect on 
premiums" (Collins 2003, AOl). The rising costs of health 
care not only in Utah, but nationwide, have been a concern 
to many lawmakers. One of the most commonly cited reasons 
for the rising cost of health care are medical malpractice law-
suits, and "runaway" juries awarding excessive amounts for 
damages which allegedly led to exorbitant medical malprac-
tice insurance premiums for doctors. Such was the case with 
Grant Carter, MD. "After making the hardest decision of his 
life, Grant Carter had to break the bad news to his patients: 
He was no longer delivering babies." In giving his reason for 
leaving the practice he commented, "It became economically 
unfeasible" (Hamilton 2004c, AOl). 
Virtually all of us have heard about the sudden spikes in 
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medical malpractice insurance premiums for Utah physicians 
Catherine D Burton, MD in a letter to several legislators 
claimed, "We, as physicians will eventually be forced out of 
medicine (as some of our colleagues already have) because of 
uncontrollable medical malpractice" (C Burton, 2004) 
Alarming statistics are often cited For example, the 
University of Utah has seen the number of Ob-Gyn resident 
applications decrease from 175 applicants five years ago to 
only 126 this year (Hamilton 2004b, A01) This example is 
valid, as medical malpractice insurance premiums have 
increased rapidly over the last few years In fact, "Utah Ob-
Gyns saw their insurance premiums jump 94 percent over the 
past four years, from $42,000 to $81,628 per year" (Hamilton 
2004b, A01) Other physicians in the state and country have 
experienced similar increases This rapid jump threatens the 
future of our health care system Some argue that in the near 
future it will be difficult to find Ob-Gyns and other high spe-
cialty doctors Doctors and the insurance industry contend 
that there are a skyrocketing number of medical malpractice 
lawsuits, and that these lawsuits are pnmanly to blame for the 
sharp premium increase The threat of malpractice lawsuits is 
one that most physicians feel very strongly about Addressing 
this threat, Dr T Scott Lindley said, "The closest parallel I 
can think of is having cancer or a chronic, incurable disease" 
(Collins 2004, A01) 
THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS: INTENSE 
PRESSURE AND FLAWED ANALYSIS 
In the 2003 General Legislative Session, Senator Leonard 
Blackham (R-Morom) introduced Senate Bill 138 The bill 
would amend Utah Code Ann 78-14-17, that was enacted in 
1999, in the following ways 
1 Allowed a physician to refuse care if the patient declined 
to sign an arbitration agreement 
2 Provided for automatic reneu al of the agreement each 
year unless the agreement is canceled m writing before 
the renewal date 
3 Allowed the patient to rescmd the agreement within 30 
days of signing the agreement 
4 Required that one arbiter be chosen by all persons claiming 
damages one arbiter be selected by the health care 
provider and a third arbiter be selected jointly from a list of 
individuals approved by the state or federal courts of Utah 
A strong lobbying effort was mounted by well-funded groups 
such as Intermountam Health Care (IHC), UMA, and the 
Utah Medical Insurance Association (UMIA) The lobbying 
effort had begun well before the opening of the legislative ses-
sion On December 20, 2002, one month before the 2003 leg-
islative session began, the Utah Trial Lawyers Association's 
(UTLA) leaders were in attendance at a meeting in the 
UMA's offices Douglas G Mortensen, President of the 
UTLA Board of Governors, related what happened 
Representatives of the Utah Medical Association Utah 
Medical Insurance Association and the Utah Hospital 
Association revealed their commitment to amend Utah's 
arbitration statute in a wa^  which would allow physicians to 
refuse care to patients declining to sign arbitration agree 
ments We were invited to support, or at least not oppose 
the legislation We were uarned that if we opposed the legis 
lation, other medical malpractice "reform" measures even less 
favorable to our clients and to us would be introduced (2004 
4) 
The UTLA found itself in a difficult position, and on 
February 14th 2003, a deal was struck The UTLA and the 
Utah Healdi Care Community issued a joint statement that 
acknowledged the withdrawal of other bills in return for the 
UTLA's "withdrawing its opposition to S B 138 " The deal 
included the addition of a six-year "sunset" provision to the 
legislation In commenting on this deal, Mortensen wrote "In 
agreeing to withdraw its opposition to S B 138, UTLA did 
not agree that allowing health care providers to refuse treat-
ment to patients declining to sign pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements was in the public interest or would likely lead to a 
decrease in malpractice premiums, nor did it agree that a med-
ical malpractice lawsuit "cnsis" existed" (2004) 
After the withdrawal of UTLA's opposition, S B 138 
passed in the Utah State Senate on February 21, 2003, by a 
vote of 24-3-2, and later in the Utah House of 
Representatives on March 5, 2003, by a vote of 63-11-1 S B 
138 passed despite the unanimous opinion of the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA), Amencan Bar Association 
(ABA), and the American Medical Association (AMA) pub-
lished in their July 1998 fmal report on health care dispute 
resolution which stated that "The agreement to use arbitra-
tion should be knowing and voluntary In disputes involv-
ing patients, binding forms dispute resolution should be used 
only where the parties agree to do so after the dispute ans-
es " (American Arbitration Association [AAA], American 
Bar Association [ABA], Amencan Medical Association 
[AMA], 1998) In passing this bill the legislature gave inade-
quate consideration to the scope of the problem, the causes of 
the problem, the proposed solution, and the impact of the bill 
on the public 
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
A 1999 report regarding "medical errors" by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) demonstrates that far too many Americans 
face serious possibility of injury, or even death, due to medical 
mistakes in hospitals Using the IOM's low estimate of 44,000 
deaths per year, medical errors are the eighth leading cause of 
death in the United States, ahead of both breast cancer and 
AIDS The IOM's high-range estimate of 98,000 deaths a year 
would make medical error related deaths the fifth leading 
cause of death, more than all other accidental deaths com-
bined (Institute of Medicine, 1999) 
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THE CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM 
Are medical malpractice lawsuits and "runaway juries" award-
ing excessive amounts for damages to blame for the high costs 
of health care? Each side has numbers and statistics to support 
their claim. The many conflicting charts and graphs can easily 
lead to confusion. As one article reported, "The arguments pro 
and con are full of data - and honest differences of opinion 
about how to interpret them. Sorting out the truth is as frus-
trating as trying to scoop water with a pillowcase" (Collins 
2004, A01). Utah is not the only state struggling to sort out the 
mounds of data. An article in Florida's Sun Sentinel stated: 
During the 13 hours of grilling, senators watched a gaggle of 
state officials, lobbyists, doctors, and insurance executives eat 
their previously quoted words - or wish they could. "We have 
been working on the issue for one year, but we got more infor-
mation in two days when we were able to extract the truth 
under oath," observes Sen. Durrell Peaden jr., a Republican. 
In other words, when witnesses who lie could face charges of 
perjury, the Judiciary Committee stopped getting "weasel 
words" and "doublespeak," says Sen. Tom Lee, another 
Republican. In sworn testimony, senators learned that doctors 
are not fleeing the state, applications to practice medicine 
here have increased, emergency rooms and trauma centers are 
not closing doors because of rising medical malpractice pre-
miums, frivolous malpractice lawsuits are not a problem, and 
malpractice lawsuits [awards] have not skyrocketed 
(Goldstein 2003, A01). 
Is this the case in Utah? Is there really no crisis at all? Several 
statistics cannot be ignored. As a percent of their total 
income, doctors pay about the percentage of income for med-
ical malpractice insurance as they have historically paid. For 
surgeons, that figure is about 6 percent, for Ob-Gyns about 8.5 
percent, and for all physicians in general it is about 5 percent 
(Newhall, 2004a). Over the last ten years malpractice payouts 
have grown an average of 6.2 percent between 1990 and 
2001. That is almost exactly the rate of medical inflation; an 
average of 6.7 percent between 1990 and 2001 (Woellert 
2003). And, if caps on damages are the answer as many claim, 
then why do 11 of the 25 identified medical malpractice cri-
sis states already have caps in place? (Newhall 2004a). 
Currently nineteen states including Utah have implemented 
caps on non-compensatory economic damages. For example, 
the most that a person can be awarded in non-economic dam-
ages in Utah is $400,000. The Weiss Report shows that while 
caps on awards did reduce the burden on insurers, most insur-
ers continued to increase premiums at a rapid pace. This has 
been the case in Utah. Further, the report states that "there 
are other, far more important factors driving the rise in med-
ical malpractice premiums than caps or medical malpractice 
payouts" (Weiss 2003). 
According to Doug Mortensen, President of UTLAs 
Board of Governors, there is also much evidence that, "so-
called measures of 'tort reform' having the effect of restricting 
the rights of injured patients, have never brought about their 
proponents' promised decrease in malpractice premiums" 
(2004). In testimony given before the Subcommittee on 
Health of the U.S. House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce regarding medical malpractice insurance rates, 
Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director of the Consumer 
Federation of America (CFA), stated that "Medical 
Malpractice rates are not rising in a vacuum. Commercial 
insurance rates are rising overall" (2002). Regarding the 
claims that medical malpractice premiums are the cause of the 
increase in the cost of health care, Clark Newhall, MD, JD, 
points out: 
Medical malpractice insurance premiums have nothing to do 
with increases in health care costs. It is true that the most cur-
rent figures show that out of the 1.55 trillion dollars in health 
care costs only $8.8 billion are medical malpractice insurance 
premiums. That works out to 57 cents in malpractice premi-
um for every 100 dollars in health care costs (2004b). 
The maximum potential savings that could be attained if all 
forms of legal redress for injured patients were eliminated 
would be under 60 cents on a $100 medical bill. This figure is 
not a significant enough percentage to justify the constant 
allegation that medical malpractice insurance costs are to 
blame for the high cost of health care. Furthermore, medical 
malpractice premiums as a percent of health care costs have 
been steadily declining over the past decade from .95 percent 
in 1988 to an estimated .57 percent in 2003 (A.M. Best's and 
Company, 2001). So what is the cause of the drastic increase 
in medical malpractice premiums? The facts point to the nat-
ural "insurance cycle" of "hard" and "soft" markets. 
In his testimony, Travis Plunkett of the CFA gave many 
answers to the cause of increasing premiums. "Insurers are 
pointing fingers," Plunkett said, "when they should be look-
ing in the mirror." Further he stated that it is the "hard insur-
ance market and the insurance industry's own business prac-
tices that are largely to blame for the rate shock that physi-
cians have experienced in recent months" (Plunkett 2002). 
Ironically, his opinion was even recognized by IHC. In an 
internal memo, IHC stated that "A number of observers 
believe that the cycle of insurance company investments, and 
their subsequent hard and soft markets, correlate better with 
the pattern of changes in malpractice premium rates than do 
jury awards - either numbers of awards or dollars" (McConkie 
2004). 
Insurance is a cyclical business. According to the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners: 
underwriting cycles may be caused by some or all of the fol-
lowing factors: 1. Adverse loss shocks...unusually large loss of 
shock may lead to supra-competitive prices. 2. Changes in 
interest rates... 3. Under pricing in soft markets (National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners [NAIC] 1991). 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the insurance industry had been 
in a soft market since the late 1980s. The usual six to ten year 
economic cycle had been expanded by the amazing stock 
market of the 1990s. No matter how much insurance compa-
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nies cut their rates, they wound up having a great year when 
investing the "float" on the premium in this amazing market 
(the float occurs during the time between when premiums are 
paid to the insurer and losses paid out by the insurer—for 
example there is about a 15 month lag in auto insurance). 
Further, interest rates were relatively high in recent years as 
the Federal Reserve focused on inflation. But, from the year 
2000 to 2002, the market turned with a vengeance and the 
Fed cut interest rates again and again. Item two above had 
occurred well before September 11. Item three above, the low 
rates, were also apparent. Insurance companies* operating 
profit as a percentage of premium dropped from 13 percent of 
premium in 1997 to about 3.5 percent of premium in 2000 
(A.M. Best Company 2001). Well before September 11 the 
cycle had turned, rates were rising, and a hard market was 
developing. As Plunkett states, "An anticipated price jump of 
10 to 15 percent in 2001 was predicted by the CFA and con-
firmed by the Insurance Information Institute" (2002). 
Item number one, the shock loss, was all that was miss-
ing. The attacks of September 11 provided that in an aching-
ly painful way. While the increases were mostly due to the 
cycle turn, they were sped up by the attack, collapsing two 
years of anticipated increases into a few months. The prac-
tices of the insurance industry itself are largely to blame. 
Plunkett noted that "Each time the cycle turns from a soft 
market to a hard market the response by insurers is pre-
dictable: they shift from inadequate under-pricing to uncon-
scionable over-pricing, cut back on coverage, and blame large 
jury verdicts for the problem" (2002). 
This turn in cycle had a particularly strong effect on 
Utah's largest medical malpractice insurer. The physician run 
UMIA is a relatively small company and so it finds it harder 
to keep rates low in an era when the larger insurers are com-
peting for the business of Utah physicians. When the market 
turned down, many of the larger insurers got out of the med-
ical malpractice insurance business. However, smaller insurers 
like the UMIA, who have no other choice, remained in the 
medical malpractice insurance business and watched as their 
profits plummeted. Physicians became outraged when they 
suddenly had to raise rates to make up for the previous years 
of less expensive coverage. 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: IHG'S ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENT 
Soon after die adoption of S.B. 138, IHC implemented 
mandatory arbitration for many of its customers. In a radio 
interview Senator Parley Hellewell (R-Orem) admitted, 
"When we passed the bill last year, we had no idea what kinds 
of things that IHC would put in their contract that would 
make it so one-sided and so lopsided" (2004). An analysis of 
common provisions of IHC's and other arbitration agreement 
follows: 
1. High cost of Arbitration: Article 3 (C) of IHC's arbi-
tration agreement stated that: "Patient(s) and 
Provider(s) will each pay the fees and expenses of the 
arbitrator they appointed. Each side shall also pay one-
half of the fees and expenses of the Presiding 
Arbitrator and the other expenses of the arbitration 
panel." (McConkie 2004). Patients pay thousands of 
dollars per day to arbitrate. Most cases occupy more 
than one day and a complicated case could occupy 
many more. For example, a ten day case would cost 
$40,000, of which the patient is required to pay half, 
win or lose. Compared to a court filing fee of about 
$200, and arbitration is clearly the more expensive 
option. In court, the the process is at no cost to either 
the defendant or the plaintiff. 
2. Forfeiture of past or future claims. Upon signing the 
agreement, patients must give up their right to sue 
IHC for any past or future claims, and pursue those 
claims through arbitration. For example, patients with 
medical injuries that occurred prior to the signing of 
the agreement, and for which an action may be cur-
rently pending, can be forced to start those claims 
from the beginning, this time through arbitration. 
3. Patients forfeit their right to sue any person or com-
pany who contracts with IHC: The arbitration agree-
ment covers "any person or entity in any way 
employed by, contracting with, or working for IHC" 
(McConkie 2004). Parties not even employed by IHC 
and others who are not actual signatories to the docu-
ment are thereby released from any civil legal action 
for malpractice. For example, if IHC contracts with a 
company that supplies a faulty pacemaker, the patient 
cannot sue that company. 
4. IHC retains the right to sue patients: Patients give 
up their right to go to trial against IHC. However, 
IHC reserves the right to go to trial and pursue legal 
action by any means against a patient. 
5. Patients have no right of appeal: "Arbitration is your 
sole and exclusive remedy. That means that you waive 
your right to...seek any other legal remedy" 
(McConkie 2004). Arbitration is final and binding, 
meaning that the patient is bound by die decision of 
the arbitration panel. Patients waive their right to 
seek any other legal remedy. The ability to appeal 
influences bodi parties to reach a fair and just deci-
sion. Without the right to appeal, this important 
check on the legal system is lost. 
6. Patients sign away more than just their rights: 
Patients sign away the rights of their spouse, heirs, 
children, and unborn children: IHC maintains that 
parents can forfeit the legal right to sue of dieir minor 
and unborn children and that one spouse can forfeit 
the rights of another, even when they are separated, 
without mutual consent and knowledge. 
7. Secrecy of arbitration proceedings: The outcome of 
arbitration proceeding is private and confidential. 
While IHC maintained that it was an important pro-
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tection of a patient's right to privacy, this provision of 
the arbitration agreement prevents the public from 
eveT learning the identities of IHC physicians who 
potentially practice bad medicine in that diey have 
been repeatedly accused or convicted of malpractice. 
However, IHC will be able to closely track the out-
come of arbitration proceedings. The information 
gathered could be used by IHC to improve its defense 
strategies while patients will be denied access to infor-
mation to prepare for their own cases. For example, if 
an arbiter on the approved list leans in IHC's direction 
repeatedly when deciding a case, the patient will not 
have access to this information while IHC will. 
8. Arbitration agreement automatically renews itself: 
The IHC contract automatically renews each year 
unless the patient cancels the agreement before the 
renewal date. Once IHC receives a signature for treat-
ment, the agreement does not end. IHC makes renew-
al automatic each year. The only way to get out of the 
agreement is for the patient to contact IHC and follow 
their procedures to cancel the agreement. Upon ter-
mination of the agreement the patient is asked to go 
elsewhere for medical help. 
9. Patients are coerced into signing IHC arbitration 
agreements: In most cases, patients are part of 
employee/employer health plans. This means that 
they are less able to change their health plan unless 
their employer switches all employees over to a new 
health plan. In rural areas and in other high specialty 
areas many times there are no other alternatives. It is 
more than likely that a patient who refuses to sign the 
agreement must chose no treatment at all. Without 
other options available to the patient, his or her abili-
ty to choose is severely limited. 
POLICY IMPACT 
While the passage of S.B. 138 drew little public attention, 
IHC's implementation of their mandatory arbitration agree-
ment did. Whether the public understood the fine points of 
the legislation is doubtful. However, the one-sided nature of 
the bill soon became evident. In late November of 2003, IHC 
mailed out over 170,000 letters to Utah citizens in Bountiful 
and Salt Lake City announcing that patients would be 
required to sign the arbitration agreement before receiving 
medical care. They were told that if they refused to sign the 
agreement they would have to go elsewhere for medical care. 
Certainly, the way in which IHC presented arbitration, and 
the details of their agreement, were diought unethical by 
many, even by those within the health care community. Scott 
Barton, an Ob-Gyn at Old Farm Obstetrics and Gynecology7 
in Salt Lake City, said, "It's unfortunate that IHC made this 
come to a head. I don't know if IHC took enough time to 
explain it [arbitration] to their patients" (Hamilton 2004a, 
B01). Even R. Chet Loftis, UMA General Counsel, in an e-
mail to legislators wrote, "We believe that it is unfortunate 
that IHC chose to introduce arbitration to its patients in the 
way that it did" (2004). 
Thousands of consumers were surprised and even out-
raged when they learned the details of the agreement. As a 
KSL editorial noted, "Last year, you'll recall, lawmakers passed 
a bill to allow mandatory medical arbitration. To say the pub-
lic didn't buy it is an understatement. The outcry was loud 
and determined" ("Medical Arbitration" 2004). In a poll con-
ducted January 18, 2004, by the Salt Lake Tribune, the subjects 
were asked: "Should health care providers be allowed to 
require arbitration of disputes over possible medical malprac-
tice and prohibit lawsuits as a condition of treatment?" 56.3 
percent responded "No," 34-8 percent responded "Yes," and 
8.9 percent responded "Don't know" ("Should Health Care" 
2004). In addition, a Dan Jones and Associates poll conduct-
ed Dec 27-Jan 3 2003-2004, asked: "In general, do you favor 
or oppose patients signing binding arbitration agreements 
before being treated by a doctor or hospital?" Similar results 
were found, as 22 percent responded that diey were strongly 
in favor, 17 percent responded that they were somewhat in 
favor, and 38 percent indicated strong opposition to arbitra-
tion agreements (Collins 2004, A01). 
POLICY EVALUATION: A LEGISLATIVE CORRECTION 
In the weeks leading up to the 2004 legislative session the 
debate heated up. Sides were formed, including groups such as 
Patients Against Mandatory Medical Arbitration (PAMMA) 
and the Utah's Citizen's Alliance (UCA), both fighting to 
repeal S.B. 138, while arbitration supporters included IHC, 
the Arbitration Alliance, and hundreds of Utah physicians. 
Each organization had well funded agendas and convincing 
lobbyists to sway the views of not only the lawmakers, but the 
public as a whole. As the Deseret Morning News reported on 
December 24, 2003: 
Members of a group called PAMMA, Patients Against 
Mandatory Medical Arbitration, picketed outside the Salt 
Lake Clinic...handing out information packets and waving 
signs with messages like 'IHC refuses to treat sick babies! Sign 
or Suffer' (Collins 2003a, B01). 
On the first day of the 2004 Utah General Legislative Session 
lawmakers were greeted in the capitol with a rally of more 
than 30 protesters urging the repeal of S.B. 138. They were 
joined by legislators such as Representative Mike Thompson 
(R-Orem), and Senator Parley Hellewell. 
Two pieces of legislation were proposed to repeal S.B. 
138: S.B. 117 sponsored by Senator Parley Hellewell, and S.B. 
245 sponsored by Senator Leonard Blackham. At the begin-
ning of the session, the differences in the pieces of legislation 
were few. They both repealed the right of a physician to refuse 
care to a patient who declined to sign an arbitration agree-
ment, however S.B. 117 called for a sole arbiter in the case 
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that a patient voluntarily opted for arbitration; while S.B. 245 
called for a panel of three. At first IHC opposed both pieces 
of legislation, but as a local newspaper reported: 
IHC had only tested the policy for three months before bow-
ing to pressure from legislators, patients' advocacy groups, and 
trial lawyers. Now, the 400 IHC-employed physicians in Salt 
Lake County and Bountiful will no longer demand patients to 
sign agreements or be refused care.... IHC reversed its hard' 
line support of forced arbitration and agreed to back a bill pro-
posed by Sen. Leonard Blackham, R-Moroni (Hamilton 
2004c, A01). 
Even Elliott J. Williams, a prominent former advocate for S.B. 
138, when speaking in a Utah House Minority Caucus meet-
ing stated, "We all agree that compulsory arbitration was not 
a good idea.... [Arbitration as an option if chosen voluntari-
ly is a good one" (2004). The complete reversal of opinion 
was almost immediate as IHC struggled to maintain its repu-
tation. 
The issue soon turned into not whether or not a physi-
cian could require arbitration agreements, but whether a one 
or three member panel should be used when a patient had 
voluntarily chosen arbitration. Strong opinions were voiced 
from each side. Senator Parley Hellewell said, "With three 
arbitrators, it guarantees that IHC wins every single time" 
(Spangler 2004), while Elliott Williams, the self-proclaimed 
Utah arbitration expert, said that "Most Utah arbiters are 
reluctant or refuse to take cases where they are the sole deci-
sion maker." The advocates of a single arbiter cited lower 
costs to consumers, while the advocates of a three member 
panel cited the "small universe of people qualified to be a sole 
arbiter" as the basis for their argument (Williams 2004). 
The issue continued to be debated until the final hours of 
the legislative session. It was finally resolved in a quick hall 
huddle in the final few hours of the legislative session. "That 
was one of the quickest conference committees I've been 
to... . Fast and furious" remarked Senator Blackham (Bryson 
2004b). The result of the conference committee was a widely 
accepted compromise, and the final bill: 
1. Prohibited a health care provider from denying health 
care to a patient in the sole basis that the patient 
refused to sign an arbitration agreement. 
2. Allowed the patient to rescind a signed arbitration 
agreement within 10 days of signing it. 
3. Established a three member arbitration panel unless 
both sides agree to a single arbiter. 
S.B. 245 passed die Utah State Senate on March 3, 2004 by 
a unanimous vote of 26 to 0 with three absent, and later 
passed the Utah House of Representatives on the same day by 
a vote of 64 to 6 with 5 absent. "We hope this will be resolved 
once and for all," said Senate President Al Mansell (R-Sandy) 
(Bryson 2004a). Senator Blackham, the sponsor of S.B. 245, 
commented, "I believe this is a well balanced approach that is 
fair and reasonable" (Bryson 2004b). However, not all were 
pleased with the outcome. Cheryll Willey, office manager at 
Wasatch Internal Medicine, said, "We were getting a five per-
cent discount from UMIA, which is peanuts, but every little 
bit helps because the malpractice rates are so expensive" 
(Hamilton 2004, A01). While a five percent discount on 
medical malpractice premiums may help some struggling doc-
tors, the Legislature agreed that mandatory medical arbitra-
tion was too high a price to pay. 
CONCLUSION 
The repeal of S.B. 138 was a victory for the citizens of Utah. 
It shows, to a certain extent, that the opinions of Utahns can 
have a significant effect on decisions of the Utah State 
Legislature. Mandatory arbitration was enacted due to a lack 
of information and foresight. The overwhelming majority of 
legislators accepted the claims by the UMA and UMIA that 
health care costs were rising due to large medical malpractice 
payouts. Few legislators understood the complexity and scope 
of the problem. Once properly informed, the Legislature 
acted to right die wrong it had created only one year prior. In 
this case the Utah State Legislature should be commended for 
its quick response and urged to give a more thorough and crit-
ical analysis of the hundreds of bills proposed each year. 
Many of us unrealistically expect and assume that our 
elected officials make decisions only after being properly 
informed. The passage and later repeal of S.B. 138 shows that 
there are serious faults in the way that our legislators receive 
their information. In many instances important decisions are 
made without the proper time for debate and analysis. As not 
only die sheer quantity of legislation increases, but more com-
plicated issues come before the Utah State Legislature, more 
and more legislators turn to lobbyists, colleagues, and other 
special interests for direction. In this setting of rushed analy-
sis and speculation, it becomes easy for a legislator to accept 
the facts and figures presented by interest groups as reality. In 
an intense and compact legislative session, it is ever more 
unrealistic to expect any issue to receive adequate attention, 
and the possibility of "legislative errors" is enhanced. 
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following phrase, clause, or discourse <I can only say this: it wasn't here yesterday 
b : this time or place <expected to return before this> 
2 a : the one nearer or more immediately under observation or discussion <this is 
iron and that is tin> b : the one more recently referred to 
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